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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1964, the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment was
held applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.' Just two years later, the Supreme Court of the United
States would issue arguably the single most important opinion in criminal
procedure in Miranda v. Arizona.2 This landmark case would go on to set
the tone for criminal interrogations for the next half-century. Miranda was
attempting to achieve a balance between the need to protect a suspect's privi-
lege against self-incrimination and law enforcement's interests in interrogat-
ing criminals and legally obtaining a confession.3 In doing so, the Court
* The author is a J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center and a graduate of Florida State University. The author wishes to thank his
family and friends for all of their encouragement and support, with a special thanks to Alyssa
Posar for her love and motivation. The author extends special recognition to Professor Joseph
Harbaugh and Professor Barbara Britzke for their continual advice and guidance over the
years. He would also like to thank the members of Nova Law Review for their hard work.
1. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,6 (1964).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Id. at 439, 441-42.
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created what is now known as the Miranda warning to be given any time a
suspect is brought into custody and interrogated.4 The warnings inform a
suspect of his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney before and at
any time during the interrogation.5 Miranda is now considered "one of the
court's best-known creations" and is constantly the subject of criminal pro-
cedure in the courtroom, interrogation room, and in TV crime dramas alike.6
Over the years, Miranda has sustained subtle setbacks and restrictions
to provide police with more leeway in seeking confessions and avoiding the
suppression of evidence.7 However, Miranda fought, scratched and clawed
its way to survival. But, it was not until this year when the Supreme Court
issued a devastating three-punch combination of opinions which may have
put Miranda out for good. Florida v. Powell,8 Maryland v. Shatzer,9 and
Berghuis v. Thompkins' ° all appear to demonstrate a trend toward an ap-
proach inconsistent with the principles outlined in Miranda. In the span of
roughly six months, the Court has decided that a suspect's rights now expire
after fourteen days," an incarcerated inmate is no longer considered to be
"in-custody,"'' 2 police no longer need to expressly inform a suspect that he
has the right to have an attorney present during the interrogation, 3 and a
suspect must speak in order to remain silent, or he risks waiving his right to
remain silent.'
4
This article will present a look at the cases which have come to shape
the law of the United States and illustrate how the Court's most recent opi-
nions do or do not pose a threat to the viability of Miranda. Part II of this
4. Id. at 444.
5. Id.
6. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court: Suspects Must Invoke Right to Remain Silent in
Interrogations, WASH. POST, June 2, 2010, at A5.
7. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 644 (2004) (holding that although an un-
Mirandized statement itself may be inadmissible, physical evidence obtained or discovered
from un-Mirandized statements is admissible at trial as long as the statements were not com-
pelled); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (noting that failure to administer Miranda
warning before a confession will not necessarily exclude admissibility of a second confession
after Miranda warning, where the statement was voluntary and uncoerced); New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984) (accepting that situations exist where the rules of Miranda
should not apply); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975) (allowing statements made in
violation of Miranda to be admitted for impeachment purposes).
8. 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010).
9. 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010).
10. 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
II. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223.
12. Id.
13. Powell, 130 S. Ct., at 1204-05.
14. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260.
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article will present a brief history into the Miranda decision and provide its
rationale and underlying purpose. Part III will discuss an important decision
by the Supreme Court of the United States which essentially set the record
straight and established Miranda's constitutional underpinnings once and for
all. Part IV of the article will look at three significant Supreme Court deci-
sions rendered so far this year. It will present the facts, holdings and ratio-
nales given by the Court in Florida v. Powell, Maryland v. Shatzer, and
Berghuis v. Thompkins. The article will illustrate how each of these cases
dealt significant blows to the long standing Miranda warning requirements
and its underlying purpose, with the bulk of the analysis pertaining to the
Berghuis case. The Berghuis analysis will point out what has historically
been required for a defendant to invoke and waive his right to remain silent
and discuss how the decision defies the principals set forth in Miranda. Part
V will present the arguments that Berghuis is inconsistent with Miranda and
the Constitution by pointing out the flaws in the majority's reasoning. This
section will also present the views of supporters of the decision. Lastly,
Parts VI and VII, respectively, will provide the author's critical analysis of
the Berghuis decision and reach an ultimate conclusion and recommendation
going forward.
II. THE MIRANDA WARNING Is BORN
The rights and protections afforded to suspects have come a long way
since the days of torture and third degree brutality as a customary method of
extracting confessions.' 5 However, this created a shift to psychologically
based interrogation tactics which can still lead to coercion. 6 Regardless of
which method of coercion may have been used, none of the cases prior to
Miranda v. Arizona provided a suspect with "appropriate safeguards . . .to
15. See Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59, 61-62 (7th Cir. 1958) (noting that the defendant
was beaten by five police officers, sustaining multiple bruises and broken bones and spent
eight months in the hospital); People v. Matlock, 336 P.2d 505, 511-12 (Cal. 1959) (finding
that the defendant was interrogated under sleep deprivation tactics and placed on a cold board
every time he became sleepy); Bruner v. People, 156 P.2d 11I, 120 (Colo. 1945) (stating that
the defendant was not allowed to eat for a period of fifteen hours, could not use the toilet
without taking a lie detector test, and was held for over two months); Kier v. State, 132 A.2d
494, 496 (Md. 1957) (recognizing that the defendant was strapped naked to a chair and threat-
ened to think police would take skin and hair scraping from anywhere on his body where
blood or sperm could be found); People v. Portelli, 205 N.E.2d 857, 858 (N.Y. 1965) (noting
that there was beating and torturing of the suspect to acquire incriminating statements).
16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966) ("[M]odern practice of in-custody
interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented. '[C]oercion can be mental as
well as physical ....') (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960)).
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insure that the statements were truly the product of free choice."'17 The Mi-
randa holding implemented those safeguards.
The seminal case of Miranda v. Arizona clarified and established the
rights afforded to criminal suspects during police custodial interrogations. 18
The Supreme Court of the United States cited a need for precise procedures
and guidelines in order to guarantee and protect an individual's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self incrimination.' 9 In general, Miranda es-
tablished the rule that before any custodial interrogation,2° the suspect must
be made aware of his or her right to remain silent and right to have an attor-
ney present.2' This warning provides the best avenue for protection of an
individual's privilege against self incrimination when being questioned in an
inherently coercive environment under the pressure and intimidation of his
adversary.22 Once provided, interrogation must cease "[i]f the individual
indicates in any manner ... that he wishes to remain silent. '23 Any statement
obtained without this warning or after the privilege has been invoked is con-
sidered compelled and may not be admitted into evidence. 4
III. ESTABLISHING THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF MIRANDA
Since the Miranda ruling, there has been widespread debate over
whether the Miranda safeguard is a constitutional rule or just a regulation
created under the Court's supervisory authority.25 Some courts held firm that
Miranda safeguards were merely prophylactic rules to protect the Fifth
17. Id. at 457. "[P]rivilege [against self-incrimination] is fulfilled only when the person
is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise
of his own [free] will."' Id. at 460 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).
18. Id. at 479.
19. Id. at 439.
20. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The Supreme Court defined custodial interrogation as
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id.
21. Id. at 479. The Court specifically delineated the instructions needed to protect the
suspect's constitutional rights as follows:
[A suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence
of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires.
Id.
22. Id. at 467.
23. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
24. Id.
25. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000).
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Amendment privilege against self incrimination.26 Others have preached the
constitutional roots of Miranda and its own distinct constitutional status.
Much of the debate has stemmed from the language of the Miranda opinion
itself.28 The Supreme Court of the United States settled the debate in Dicker-
son v. United States29 by expressly refusing to overrule Miranda and reiterat-
ing the Miranda warning's status as "a constitutional rule that Congress may
not supersede legislatively. 30
Dickerson dealt with the issue of whether Congress had proper authority
to statutorily overrule Miranda.31 Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501 two
years after the Miranda decision.32 This statute would turn the analysis of
admissibility of a statement on whether the statement was voluntary and ig-
nore whether Miranda was satisfied.33 Experts debated that the statute
should be upheld because the Constitution does not forbid the use of a volun-
tary statement in a federal case. 34 However, the Court relied on stare decisis
for support that Miranda is a constitutional decision and has been consistent-
ly applied to state court prosecutions.35 The Court officially dubbed Miran-
da's warning requirement as Constitutional, stating that "Congress may not
legislatively supersede [judicial] decisions interpreting and applying the
26. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) ("Miranda Court adopted
prophylactic rules designed to insulate the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights"); New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984) (stating Miranda warning requirement is only a "prophy-
lactic" and does not always need to be rigidly followed); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
444 (1974) (agreeing that Miranda protections are not required by the Constitution).
27. See Winthrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993) ("'Prophylactic' though it may
be, in protecting a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Miranda
safeguards a 'fundamental trial right."') (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 264 (1990): Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990) (explaining Miranda rests on
the Fifth Amendment); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986) (describing Miranda as
an "interpretation of the Federal Constitution").
28. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (stating that the Miranda decision "in no way creates a
constitutional straitjacket" and "encourage[s] Congress and the States to ... search for...
effective ways of protecting [individual] rights."). But see id. at 445 (referring to Miranda as
a "constitutional issue").
29. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
30. Id. at 444.
31. Id. at 437 ("Congress may not legislatively supersede [judicial] decisions interpreting
and applying the Constitution.").
32. Id. at 435.
33. Id. at 436.
34. Paul Cassell & Robert Litt, Will Miranda Survive?: Dickerson v. United States: The
Right to Remain Silent, The Supreme Court, and Congress, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1165, 1191
(2000).
35. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438. The Supreme Court does not have supervisory authority
over state courts-it only has authority to enforce Constitutional requirements. Id.
2011]
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Constitution."36 This decision "reject[ed] the only alternative that has been
presented to [Miranda] for thirty years ... lock[ing] our country into this
particular approach. 37
V. LOOSENING MIRANDA 'S GRIP ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Florida v. Powell
Florida v. Powell was the first of three cases this year to significantly
loosen the long standing strictures of the Miranda warning requirement.38
Ignoring the Miranda requirement that suspects be "clearly informed" of
their rights before any custodial interrogation,39 the Supreme Court of the
United States allowed police officers in Tampa to vary the wording of the
Miranda warning despite the potential for confusion and misunderstanding 40
So long as the warning "reasonable conveyed" the suspects rights, the Court
would allow it.4 The officers in Powell gave the defendant the following
warning:
You have the right to remain silent. If you give up the right to re-
main silent, anything you say can be used against you in court.
You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our
questions. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer one will be ap-
pointed for you without cost and before any questioning. You
have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want dur-
ing th[e] interview.
4 2
Powell subsequently waived his rights and confessed4 3  On appeal,
Powell argued that the warning he received was inadequate because it did not
inform him of his right to an attorney during the interrogation.44 The Su-
36. Id. at 437.
37. Cassell & Litt, supra note 34, at 1189. "Nothing in the Constitution requires a draco-
nian rule that a voluntary confession be suppressed whenever there has been some departures
from the Miranda procedures." Id. at 1172.
38. Adam Liptak, You Have the Right to Remain Silent. But Don't, if You Want to Use
It., N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2010, at A15; see Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1199-1200
(2010).
39. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
40. Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1199. The Court itself noted that the warnings given to Powell
were not the clearest possible formulation" for informing a suspect of his rights. Id. at 1205.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1200 (emphasis added).
43. Id.
44. Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1200.
[Vol. 35
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preme Court of Florida agreed with Powell and held that the warning did not
meet the "clearly informed" standard articulated in Miranda.4 5 The Supreme
Court of Florida further noted that this warning was misleading and indicated
to the suspect that his right to an attorney only existed before questioning.46
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve the is-
sue.
47
The Court took the view that the Miranda warning, or its equivalent,
only needs to reasonably inform suspects of their rights.48 Otherwise, a
"suspect would have to imagine an unlikely scenario ... [where] he would
be obliged to exit and reenter the interrogation room after each query. 49
However, this contradicts the notion that Miranda refuses to assume any-
thing from the suspects.5° Further indicating a steer from requiring a suspect
be "clearly informed," the Court expressly admits that the warning Powell
received were not the clearest of warnings.5' The majority relied mainly on
the catchall phrase given to Powell stating that he could invoke his rights "at
any time"-including his right to an attorney before questioning.52 While
some courts have accepted an altered reading of the Miranda warning,"
Powell marks "the first time the Court has approved a warning which ...
entirely omitted an essential element of a suspect's rights"-the right to have
an attorney present during the interrogation.54
The Powell decision wasted no time before flexing its muscle.55 Rigte-
rink v. State56 was one of the earliest cases to be reconsidered in light of
Powell.57 Rigterink, like Powell, dealt with a Miranda warning which failed
to expressly inform the suspect of his right to counsel before and during the
interrogation.58 The Supreme Court of Florida initially made its ruling that
45. State v. Powell, 998 So. 2d 531, 542 (Fla. 2008), rev'dby 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010).
46. Id.
47. Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1201.
48. Id. at 1205.
49. Id.
50. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471-72 (1966) ("[T]his warning is an absolute
prerequisite to interrogation. No amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have
been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead.").
51. Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1205.
52. Id.
53. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (accepting Miranda warning telling a
suspect that his lawyer "would be appointed 'if and when' he went to court).
54. Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1210-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. See Florida v. Rigterink, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (vacating the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Florida and remanding the case in consideration of Florida v. Powell).
56. 2 So. 3d 221 (Fla. 2009) (per curium), vacated by 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010).
57. Rigterink, 130 S. Ct. at 1235.
58. Rigterink, 2 So. 3d at 234.
2011]
7
Romano: Is Miranda on the Verge of Extinction? The Supreme Court Loosens
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
the warning was constitutionally and materially defective based on what ap-
peared to be the long standing rules illustrated in Miranda.59 Under the exact
reading of the Miranda decision, anything that does not "clearly inform" a
suspect of his rights "constitutes a narrower and less functional warning than
that required by Miranda."6 But, as illustrated above, these Miranda rules
that have been applied for so long, are not as relevant in light of Powell."
B. Maryland v. Shatzer
Just a day after Powell, the Supreme Court continued to craft a more po-
lice-friendly version of Miranda in Maryland v. Shatzer.62 In this case, the
Court held that police may re-interrogate a suspect who has previously in-
voked his Miranda right to counsel.63 While not expressly declaring it so,
the ruling modified another long standing rule of criminal procedure that was
articulated in Edwards v. Arizona.64 The Edwards rule created a perpetual
ban in which police were barred from interrogating a suspect who invoked
his Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel, until counsel is provided or
the suspect initiates the conversation on his own volition.65 Shatzer based his
argument to suppress his confession pursuant to Edwards.66
In 2003, while incarcerated on an unrelated crime, Shatzer was ques-
tioned by police regarding a sex offense.67 Shatzer indicated that he would
59. Id. at 253-54.
This [holding] is not because Rigterink is innocent; rather, it is because the rules established to
guard fundamental constitutional protections were not followed, and, under these facts, we
cannot say that the videotape-which should have been suppressed based upon proper legal
analysis-Aid not "contribute to" his convictions. The murders committed in this case were
horrific, gruesome, and worthy of condemnation; moreover, there is evidence to support the
verdicts returned by the jury. However, the rule of law must prevail and we must not allow the
ends of punishment to trump the means that our state and federal Constitutions require.
Id. at 256.
60. Id. at 253.
61. See Rigterink, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (vacating the judgment of the Supreme Court of Flori-
da and remanding the case in consideration of Florida v. Powell).
62. 130S. Ct. 1213, 1218 (2010).
63. Id.
64. 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981); see Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219 (refusing to extend Ed-
wards and allowing a suspect who has previously invoked his right to counsel, to be question-
ing again despite counsel being unavailable).
65. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 ("[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have
counsel present during custodial interrogation .... [he] is not subject to further interrogation
by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself
initiates further communication ... with the police.").
66. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1218.
67. Id. at 1217.
[Vol. 35
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 10
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss2/10
IS MIRANDA ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION?
not talk without his attorney and invoked his right to counsel. 68 The ques-
tioning ceased, and Shatzer was sent back into the prison's general popula-
tion.69 Two and a half years later, police returned to question Shatzer on the
same offense.7° He was again read his Miranda rights, but this time he
waived them and began to talk.71 It was only until Shatzer made incriminat-
ing statements, which were later used to convict him, when he again re-
quested his attorney.72 Shatzer argued to suppress his statements under the
Edwards rule.73 The Edwards theory is that once a suspect invokes his Fifth
Amendment right to counsel, a subsequent waiver of the right to counsel in
another interrogation is presumed to be involuntary.74 The implicit assump-
tion is that the second waiver was a result of police persistently attempting to
get a waiver of rights and a subsequent confession.7 ' The Court held that the
implicit dangers prevented by the Miranda safeguards and the Edwards rule
were eliminated due to the extended interval between interrogation sessions
and refused to extend Edwards to an "eternal" ban on interrogation; instead
the Court ruled that a break in Miranda custody shall create an exception to
the Edwards rule.76
The Court did not stop there. Refusing to leave any open ends, the next
step was to determine how long of a break in Miranda custody is sufficient
to still meet the suspects constitutional guarantees and dissipate any pre-
sumption of coercion.7 7 With very little thought, the Court spit out a number
and agreed that a fourteen day break in Miranda custody is sufficient.78
"That provides plenty of time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his nor-
mal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual
coercive effects of his prior custody. 79
Lastly, the Court was left to determine if sending an inmate back into
the prison from which he was retrieved, constitutes a break in custody to
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1218.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1219-20.
75. Id. at 1220.
76. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219-22.
77. Id. at 1223.
78. Id.
79. Id. But see Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156 (1990) (holding that the Ed-
wards rule preventing officers from reinitiating questioning with a suspect without counsel
present once the suspect has previously requested counsel, exists even after the suspect has
had a chance to consult with counsel).
2011]
9
Romano: Is Miranda on the Verge of Extinction? The Supreme Court Loosens
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
allow the Court to apply the newly created fourteen day rule. ° The Court
went on to draw the connection that an incarcerated inmate now makes his
home in the cell he has been assigned and that returning the inmate back to
the general population only sends him back to the environment in which he
has become most accustomed. 81 "The majority ruled that a prison sentence
was not custody in the relevant sense and that a return to the general prison
population after questioning amounted to a break in custody for the purposes
of Miranda and Edwards.82 While the dissent agrees in part that perhaps
the Court ultimately reached the proper substantive conclusion, it criticizes
the fourteen day period established by the majority and argues that the hold-
ing ignores the Edwards rationale "that custodial interrogation is inherently
compelling. '83 The dissent uses the present facts of this case-"a suspect
who is in prison"-to distinguish that a suspect who is returned back to his
cell is hardly placed back into a situation where he "returns to his normal
life" to the extent that all coercive pressures have been eliminated. 8
Shatzer was another major limitation to the Miranda protections af-
forded to suspects. The purpose of Miranda is to protect a suspect's consti-
tutional privilege against self incrimination when exposed to inherently com-
pelling pressures 85 of a police-dominated atmosphere; 86 pressures which can
80. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224; see also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984)
(stating Miranda custody as "a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the
degree associated with a formal arrest").
81. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224.
Interrogated suspects who have previously been convicted of crime live in prison. When they
are released back into the general prison population, they return to their accustomed surround-
ings and daily routine-they regain the degree of control they had over their lives prior to the
interrogation. Sentenced prisoners, in contrast to the Miranda paradigm, are not isolated with
their accusers. They live among other inmates, guards, and workers, and often can receive vis-
itors and communicate with people on the outside by mail or telephone.
Id.
82. Adam Liptak, Court Says Miranda Rights Don't Bar Requestioning, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 2010, at A18.
83. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1231-32 (Stevens J., concurring) ("The Court ignores these
understandings from the Edwards line of cases and instead speculates that if a suspect is rein-
terrogated and eventually talks, it must be that 'further deliberation in familiar surroundings
has caused him to believe (rightly or wrongly) that cooperating with the investigation is in his
interest."').
84. Id. at 1221, 1232.
A prisoner's freedom is severely limited, and his entire life remains subject to governmental
control. Such an environment is not conducive to "shak[ing] off any residual coercive effects
of his prior custody." Nor can a prisoner easily "seek advice from an attorney, family mem-
bers, and friends," especially not within [fourteen] days; prisoners are frequently subject to re-
strictions on communications. Nor, in most cases, can he live comfortably knowing that he
cannot be badgered by police.
Id. at 1232.
85. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
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cause an individual to be compelled to speak rather than exercise his own
free will. 87 However, Shatzer assumes all coercive pressures placed on an
individual expire after fourteen days.88 This holding expressly permits police
to engage in a tactic where, once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, po-
lice simply release the suspect, wait fourteen days, and try again hoping this
time the suspect is not intelligent enough to invoke his right to counsel,
which may not have been provided to him the first time around.89
C. Berghuis v. Thompkins
Berghuis v. Thompkins is the most recent Supreme Court of the United
States case concerning Miranda warnings and arguably the most damaging
to Miranda's protection of a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights.90 The de-
fendant, Thompkins, was arrested for suspicion of murder, placed in a small
interrogation room, and made to sit in a make-shift school desk.9' The offic-
ers handling the investigation then read Thompkins his Miranda rights,
which he refused to sign.92 The officer then proceeded to attempt to interro-
gate Thompkins for the next three hours.93 Thompkins remained silent dur-
ing the interrogation with the exception of "a few limited verbal responses. 9 4
After nearly three hours, the officer asked Thompkins, "'Do you believe in
God?' 95 This question finally elicited a response from Thompkins who rep-
lied "Yes" as he began to cry.96 He was then asked if he prayed to God,
which he again replied, "Yes. 97 The next question was, "Do you pray to
God to forgive you for shooting that boy down?" to which Thompkins defea-
tedly replied, "Yes. '98 "Thompkins refused to make a written confession,
86. Id. at 456.
87. Id. at 467.
88. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223.
89. Id.
90. Barnes, supra note 6.
91. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2256 (2010).
92. Id. ("[S]ign[ing] the form [would] demonstrate that [Thompkins] understood his
rights."). Cf United States v. Plugh, 576 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2009) (refusing to sign a
waiver form is an unequivocal assertion that the suspect is not willing to waive his rights).
93. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2256.
94. Id. Thompkins remained silent during the interrogation, with the exception of declin-
ing a peppermint and making a comment "that the chair he was sitting in was hard." Id. at
2256-57 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id. at 2257.
96. Id.
97. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2257.
98. Id. at 2258.
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and the interrogation ended 15 minutes later."99 His limited responses were
used to convict him."° The issue for the Court was "whether an invocation
of the fight to remain silent can be ambiguous or equivocal."' 0 ' This requires
a look as to whether Thompkins invoked his right to remain silent and
whether he waived his fight to remain silent."0 2
1. Invoking the Right to Remain Silent
The Supreme Court has never specifically addressed the steps required
of a suspect to invoke the right to remain silent.'0 3 The ultimate precedent
regarding the right to remain silent has always been Miranda, which states
that when a suspect "'indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during
questioning, that he wishes to remain silent . . . the interrogation must
cease."' 04 Davis v. United States'0° addressed the issue of whether an ambi-
guous or unequivocal statement could trigger Miranda protection.' °6 But, the
Court did so in relation to an ambiguous request or invocation of the right to
counsel subsequent to a valid express waiver.) 7 The Court held that after a
suspect has waived his Miranda fights, the suspect may invoke his fight to
counsel only by making an unambiguous, unequivocal statement requesting
counsel; otherwise, police are not required to honor the request or seek clari-
fication.0 8 Davis expressly waived his rights under Miranda and then sug-
gested that "'maybe [he] should talk to a lawyer"' during the interrogation."
This statement was not sufficient to equate to an invocation of the fight to
counsel.
Unlike a request for counsel, an invocation of the right to remain silent
does prevent the police from attempting to interrogate the suspect again after
a period of time has elapsed."0 Nevertheless, other courts have still applied
99. Id. at 2257.
100. Id. at 2256.
101. Id. at 2260.
102. Berghuis, 130. S. Ct. at 2258.
103. Id. at 2260.
104. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420 (1986) (emphasis added) (quoting
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966)).
105. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
106. Id. at 456.
107. See id. at 455.
108. Id. at 459.
109. Id. at 455.
110. Compare Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (allowing police to re-
question suspect on a different crime, two hours after he invoked his right to remain silent)
with Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981) (holding that a suspect who invokes the
right to counsel bars any police-initiated interrogation without counsel present).
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the Davis rule to the right to remain silent, although providing very little
explanation on its reasons for doing so."' Other courts have provided that
Davis applies only when there is a request for counsel subsequent to a valid
waiver. 12 The Davis rule merely requires that a suspect clarify his desire to
revive a privilege that has already been waived."
3
The Court in Berghuis rejected the argument that remaining silent was
an invocation of the right, finding it to be unpersuasive.' 14 It chose to rely on
Davis and treat the Miranda right to counsel exactly the same as the Miranda
right to silence." 5 The Court stated that requiring an express and unambi-
guous invocation of the right to remain silent creates an objective test and
makes proving the voluntariness of a confession easier.'16 The Court shifted
the focus of the analysis from the individual suspect's constitutional rights
and placed an overriding importance on the burden society would face in
prosecuting criminals." 7 Two hours and forty-five minutes of silence was
not enough for the Court to conclude that Thompkins wanted to remain silent
during the interrogation and invoke his rights." 8
2. Waiving the Right to Remain Silent
The prosecution bears the high standard and heavy burden of proving a
defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights." 9 The
111. Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence: Reconsidering the Invocation of the Right to
Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 773, 786 (2009).
112. See United States v. Plugh, 576 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2009) ("Davis only provides
guidance . . . [when] a defendant makes a claim that he subsequently invoked previously
waived Fifth Amendment rights."); United States v. Rodriguez, 518 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir.
2008) ("[Tlhe 'clear statement' rule of Davis applies only after the police have already ob-
tained [such a waiver], . . . however, an officer must clarify the meaning of an ambiguous or
equivocal response to the Miranda warning before proceeding with general interrogation.")
(emphasis omitted); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me. 2000) (declining to extend
Davis to require a suspect to unambiguously invoke his rights when there has not been a prior
waiver); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D. 2002) ("Davis, in sum, applies to an equi-
vocal postwaiver invocation of rights."); State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1997)
("[Tihe requirement ... that an officer limit his questioning to clarifying a suspect's ambi-
guous or equivocal statement must be limited to prewaiver scenarios.").
113. Brief for Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers & Am. Civil Liberties Union as Ami-
ci Curiae Supporting Respondent at 29, Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010) [he-
reinafter Brief Supporting Respondent].
114. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2253-54 (2010).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2254.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2258-59.
119. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
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defendant must fully know "the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it.' 20 Miranda illustrated the range
of the spectrum when attempting to discern the validity of a waiver as fol-
lows:
An express statement that the individual is willing to make a
statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a
statement could constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver will not be
presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings
are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact
eventually obtained. 121
North Carolina v. Butler' 22 appropriately held that the language in Mi-
randa should not be read to require a per se rule that only an express waiver
is sufficient to illustrate a waiver. 23 Butler allowed for an implicit waiver
based on "the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his
rights and a course of conduct indicating a waiver., 2' But a waiver shall not
be presumed from a suspect's silence even if the suspect eventually con-
fesses. 12 5 In Butler, the defendant refused to sign the waiver, but he express-
ly agreed to talk to the interrogating officer. 126 The determinative factor thus
turns on whether the defendant understands his rights and the consequences
of his actions. 27 However, if a suspect does express his desire to remain
silent, a statement made thereafter may be admissible as a subsequent waiver
of the right if the suspect's right to cut off questioning was scrupulously
120. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (noting that waiver must also be "volun-
tary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion or deception").
121. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
122. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
123. Id. at 375.
124. Id. at 373.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 371. But see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (holding that the
"voluntariness" of a waiver of the right to remain silent depends on the absence of an over-
reaching police probe and that a mentally ill defendant may waive his rights as long as there is
no police coercion).
127. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010). "The prosecution must make
the additional showing that the accused understood these rights." Id. at 2261; see also Colo-
rado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987) ("The Miranda warnings ensure that a waiver of
these rights is knowing and intelligent by requiring that the suspect be fully advised of this
constitutional privilege, including the critical advice that whatever he chooses to say may be
used as evidence against him."); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 530 (1987) (rejecting
defendant's argument upon a finding that he understood the consequences of making incrimi-
nating statements).
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honored. 2 8 This requires an examination into the amount of time between
interrogations, the subject matter of the second interrogation, whether a new
Miranda warning was given, and the degree to which police officer pursued
further interrogation. 1
29
In Berghuis, the Court relied on the fact that Thompkins "could read
and understand English" and knew "that police would have to honor his right
to be silent . . . during the whole course of the interrogation" in concluding
that he understood he was waiving his rights when he made the incriminating
statement.130 The Court concluded by stating broadly that "[w]here the pros-
ecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood
[an] uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain
silent." ' 3' In this case, the Court held Thompkins had not invoked his right
to remain silent and cut off questioning and subsequently made a valid waiv-
er of his right to remain silent by voluntarily making a statement, three hours
into the interrogation.
32
V. DOES BERGHUIS OVERRULE MIRANDA?
A. Arguing Against Berghuis
The Berghuis decision is claimed to have "turn[ed] Miranda upside
down."' 33 Even Justice Sotomayor, who is a former prosecutor herself and
knows the difficult task police face during interrogations, has been one of the
decision's biggest critics. '34 The crucial facts in the case are that Thompkins
refused to sign a waiver showing he understood his rights and then sat in
almost complete silence for nearly three hours before making an incriminat-
ing statement. 35 Critics argue this was not sufficient to convince the Court
that Thompkins had invoked his right to remain silent and that he had not
made a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights.
136
128. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975).
129. See id. at 104, 106 (allowing police to attempt to reinitiate questioning with a suspect
who has invoked his right to silence, after two hours).
130. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2262.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2262-63.
133. Id. at 2278 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
134. Barnes, supra note 6 ("[S]ome had speculated [Sotomayor] might be less protective
of the rights of suspects than other [justices] ....").
135. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2266 (Sotomayor J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 2266-67, 2269; see also State v. Rossignol, 627 A.2d 524, 526-27 (Me. 1993)
(holding that suspect had invoked right to remain silent by sitting in silence for twenty mi-
nutes).
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The prosecution bears a heavy burden of demonstrating a knowing and
intelligent waiver.' 37 This burden is intensified when a confession is given
after a lengthy interrogation.' 38 Miranda stops just short of declaring a pre-
sumption of coercion, but courts must still presume that a suspect "did not
waive his rights.' 39 If the Court properly applied Miranda it would clearly
show the prosecution failed to satisfy its heavy burden.140 The words "yes,"
"yes" and "yes" were the only evidence presented to show Thompkins un-
derstood he was waiving his rights.' 4' The decision shifts the burden to the
suspect to invoke his rights rather than keeping the burden on the police to
obtain a valid waiver and relinquishment of rights.142 Previously, a suspect's
rights were intact from the moment he walked into the interrogation room,
and the burden was on the police to obtain a waiver. 143 Now, a suspect must
be aware of how to invoke his rights before he enters the interrogation
room.' 44 Once a suspect has been read and understands his Miranda rights,
anything he does after that, short of expressly stating that he wants to invoke
his right to remain silent, will constitute a waiver. 45
The Court's application of the "clear invocation rule" announced in Da-
vis to the right to remain silent creates an illogical irony that is "unlikely to
convey that [a suspect] must speak" let alone speak in a particular manner. 46
A "statement" is necessary for invoking the right to counsel because "there is
no other way to invoke that right.' ' 147 A suspect cannot express that he wants
a lawyer unless he states at least some variation of "I want a lawyer."'' 48
Berghuis though, uses the act of keeping quiet and remaining silent to indi-
137. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
138. See id. at 476.
139. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
140. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2268-70 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Rarely do this Court's precedents provide clearly established law so closely on point with the
facts of a particular case. Together, Miranda and Butler establish that a court must presume
that a defendant did not waive his right; the prosecution bears a heavy burden in attempting to
demonstrate waiver; the fact of a lengthy interrogation prior to obtaining statements is strong
evidence against a finding of valid waiver; mere silence in response to questioning is not
enough; and waiver may not be presumed simply from the fact that a confession was in fact
eventually obtained.
Id. at 2270 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id. at 2271.
142. See Barnes, supra note 6.
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2271 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 2276.
147. Brief Supporting Respondent, supra note 13, at 30.
148. Id.
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cate a willingness to talk.149 Logically, it follows that one manner in which a
suspect may indicate that he wishes to remain silent is to remain silent. 5 °
Remaining silent "could be deemed the ultimate invocation.''. The suspect
is indicating what he wants to do as he is doing it. 512 The central goal of Mi-
randa-"ensur[ing] that a suspect makes a free choice to speak to the po-
lice"-is compromised by the fact that Berghuis now forces a suspect to talk
to police, or risk waiving his rights. 5 3 In essence, the decision compels a
suspect to engage in conversation with the police while misinforming the
suspect of his right to silence.
Regardless of whether remaining silent is considered an invocation of
rights, the Berghuis decision erases the Miranda requirement that a suspect
be "clearly informed" and that interrogation must cease when the suspect
"indicates in any manner" his desire to remain silent.154 Surely, the require-
ment of informing a suspect that he has the right to remain silent is left un-
disturbed, but this is no longer sufficient to clearly inform the suspect of all
his rights. "'55 The Miranda warnings give no hint as to the Court's new clear
invocation rule.5 6 Just as easily as a suspect may make a clearly unambi-
guous statement that he wishes to remain silent, the officer can just as easily
ask the suspect for clarification. Requiring an officer to ask for clarification
when a suspect makes an ambiguous statement is currently not required but
still considered good police practice.'57 A suspect who is unaware of how to
invoke his rights is unaware of his rights and is no longer clearly informed.
A suspect who must clearly state that he would like to remain silent-as the
only means of invoking his right to remain silent-can no longer indicate his
desire to do so "in any manner" as Miranda so valiantly advocated.
B. Arguing in Support of Berghuis
Some experts agree with Berghuis mainly because they remain indiffe-
rent on the decision and question the actual effect, if any, that the decision
149. Steve Chapman, The Supreme Court Hears the Sounds of Silence, REASON FOUND.
(June 3, 2010), http://reason.org/news/show/supreme-court-sounds-silence.
150. Brief Supporting Respondent, supra note 113, at 27.
151. Strauss, supra note 111, at 792.
152. Id.
153. Id. at775.
154. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471, 473-74 (1966).
155. Liptak, supra note 38.
156. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2276 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
157. Strauss, supra note I 1, at 783-84.
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will even have on current practice.1 58 Police are still required to inform a
suspect of his Miranda warnings and ask him if he understands his rights.'59
But now, police no longer need to conduct any follow up questions. 160 "If a
criminal suspect is informed of his Miranda rights and understands these
rights, the suspect can remain silent to any questioning or instead can ex-
pressly invoke the right to remain silent." 161 Miranda has been eroding since
its inception, and this is just another case delaying its inevitable extinction. 62
The Court did not take away a suspect's right to remain silent or privilege
against self incrimination. Post-Miranda silence still cannot be used against
a suspect, and the suspect will continue to be questioned until he has invoked
his rights. The decision is rather one of common sense. 63 Where the dissent
urges that silence demonstrates an unwillingness to talk, others argue it only
demonstrates a willingness to be questioned.' 64 Besides, it is human nature
to speak when attempting to clearly articulate an intention, and rarely does a
suspect ever indicate his unwillingness to talk in a manner other than ex-
pressly stating so. 65 As a result, the decision only affects an extreme minori-
ty of cases, and the human rights advocates may be exaggerating the effects
of the decision.
Taking a more cynical approach, Miranda rights are violated constantly
during interrogation, and the defense can seldom win the argument when
going against a police officer's word. 166 Miranda was supposed to put a se-
rious restraint on law enforcement's ability to interrogate a suspect, but near-
ly eighty percent of suspects still agree to talk with police after receiving the
Miranda warning. 67 Miranda is no longer viewed as a formidable obstacle
to police interrogations. 168 Even police training and procedural manuals en-
158. Troy Graham, Little Effect Seen from Court's Miranda Ruling, PHILA. INQUIRER, June
5, 2010, at BI.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Michael Crites & Anjali P. Chavan, Is Thompkins' the Death Knell of Miranda?,
LAW.COM (July 19, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202463214195&rss=
newswire.
162. Graham, supra note 158.
163. Steve Lackner, Berghuis v. Thompkins: Supreme Court Rules That Miranda Right to
Remain Silent Must Be Unambiguously Invoked by Suspect to Stop an Interrogation, STEVE
LACKNER-CONSERVATIVE NEWS, ISSUES, DEBATES, AND COMMENTARY (June 3, 2010, 09:48
PM), http://www.stevelackner.com/2010/06/berghuis-v-thompkins-supreme-court.html.
164. Chapman, supra note 149.
165. Graham, supra note 158.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Mark Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers, Confession Admissi-
bility, and the Retention of Interrogation Protections, 49 U. PriT. L. REV. 1007, 1061 (1988).
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courage police to begin the interrogation only after the suspect has demon-
strated a willingness to cooperate and to take precautions with suspects
where the Court does not require them to do SO. 169 The bottom line is if a
suspect feels he wants to talk, he will, and if he does not want to talk, he will
say SO. 1
7 0
Others point to the flaws of Miranda to illustrate the need for change,
any change. Problems arising from Miranda stem from the complete lack of
uniformity in procedures and enforcement across jurisdictions.'71 A uniform
rule should advance the underlying goal of the Self-Incrimination Clause by
"protecting the rights of suspects to both non-coercive and constitutionally-
informed interrogation.' 72  Congress no longer has authority to overrule
Miranda, and the power lies now with the Supreme Court. 173 But, the flaws
in Miranda are evidenced by the countless exceptions and loopholes that
have been created through case law.
174
Supporters have focused their arguments on criticizing Miranda and its
broad protections rather than supporting the logic of the Berghuis decision,
referring to Miranda as "an artificial rule" created under the guise of the lib-
eral Warren Court. 175 Miranda debates have created unnecessary costs, ef-
forts, and confusion among law enforcement and defendants alike. 76 Berg-
huis' relies heavily on the voluntariness of the statement and the absence of
any evidence of police coercion. 77 A voluntariness approach steers away
from artificial rules created forty years ago and draws closer towards the
actual words of the Constitution in "that no person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself' in a criminal case. 78 But until uniformity exists, the
goal of achieving constitutionally and legally effective interrogation to con-
vict criminals while ensuring they are informed of their rights cannot be
reached.79 For now, Berghuis reasonably provided much needed aid to po-
169. Brief Supporting Respondent, supra note 113, at 11.
170. Graham, supra note 158.
171. William F. Jung, Not Dead Yet: The Enduring Miranda Rule 25 Years After the
Supreme Court's October Term 1984, 28 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 447, 457 (2009) ("[T]he
most acute need for improvement.., is development of uniform warnings.... [E]ven within
jurisdictions, large differences exist in the nature of the warnings, their words, their length,
their cognitive complexity and indeed their very subject matter."). Id.
172. Id. at 456.
173. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
174. See Jung, supra note 171, at 457.
175. Barnes, supra note 6.
176. Jung, supra note 171, at 457.
177. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010).
178. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Barnes, supra note 6.
179. See Jung, supra note 171, at 457.
2o0111
19
Romano: Is Miranda on the Verge of Extinction? The Supreme Court Loosens
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
lice and "recognize[d] the 'practical realities that the police face in dealing
with suspects."" 8
It is clear that Miranda tried to achieve uniformity by striking a balance
between protecting a defendant's constitutional rights and providing law
enforcement with strict guidelines for police to follow.' 8' In theory this
seemed ideal. But we have seen how in some circumstances it is counter-
productive to let a criminal go free due to a technical deficiency in Miranda,
as demonstrated by the numerous exceptions to Miranda.82 Miranda thus
created its own contradiction by preaching its constitutional protection and
its need in any custodial interrogation and then creating exceptions when
Miranda does not appear to be as important. 83 Miranda began as a proce-
dural tool to protect a suspect from the pressure of custodial interrogation.
184
But it has since been casted into a limited and unintended role serving only
"to insure the admissibility of post-waiver statements."' 185
It makes more sense to place the burden on a suspect and require the
suspect to invoke his rights. 86 The only burden for the prosecution is to
convince the court that the statements given by the suspect were not com-
pelled and that Miranda warnings were issued. 87 Courts only require this to
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than the harsh-
er, more difficult burden of clear and convincing. 88 But the prosecution
does not also bear the burden of convincing the court that the defendant
made a wise decision by waiving the defendant's rights. 89 The Constitution
itself does not even require police officers to coach a suspect and ensure that
a suspect makes a constitutionally informed decision. Some even argue that
the Constitution requires nothing more than a mere recitation of the Fifth
Amendment and that "the statement should be admissible as long as it is not
compelled."' 90 Ignorance of the law is not a defense although this entails
180. Barnes, supra note 6.
181. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439, 441-42 (1966).
182. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 644 (2004); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298, 309 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
714, 722 (1975).
183. Cassell & Litt, supra note 34, at 1]73.
184. Berger, supra note 168, at 1063.
185. Id.
186. Liptak, supra note 38.
187. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal Found. at 12, Berghuis v. Thomp-
kins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010) (No. 08-1470) [hereinafter Brief Supporting Petitioner].
188. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986).
189. Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 187, at 11-12.
190. Liptak, supra note 38.
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possible infringement on an individual's due process rights.' 9' Ignorance of
the Constitution should follow, and an argument that a suspect did not know
the extent of his rights should not be a defense absent evidence of police
coercion. Besides, informing the suspect of his right to counsel expressly
provides the suspect with an opportunity to seek assistance from someone
acting in the suspect's benefit. It is an unlikely scenario to envision a suspect
knowingly and expressly waiving his right to silence and invoking his right
to counsel or invoking his right to counsel, but expressly waiving his right to
silence. Both options provide the same rights to the individual to cease the
interrogation upon command. The difference is in how much leeway the
police are afforded to re-question the suspect. The result of Berghuis is that
police will no longer have to guess what the suspect is thinking when he sits
in silence, having understood his rights, but choosing neither to waive them
nor invoke them.
VI. CRITIQUE
The discussion here is not whether Miranda is a constitutional require-
ment or whether it is the only sufficient method of ensuring constitutional
rights. The discussion here is whether Miranda remains intact in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Berghuis. In this respect, the answer appears to
be a definitive "no." The Supreme Court created an even greater confusion
by stating that the four Miranda warnings are still required, but ignoring the
essential principles and underlying reasons for the warnings-to clearly in-
form the suspect of his rights so that a suspect cannot argue, at least in
theory, a violation of the privilege against self incrimination. The problem in
Berghuis is that the Court severed core aspects of Miranda while claiming it
remains intact and leaving little guidance on how police should apply the
decision. What remained was a muddled opinion, chalk full of confusing
logic, that would make at least four scholarly Supreme Court Justices scratch
their heads.
It was only when Thompkins' case reached the Supreme Court that he
was informed of the need to expressly and explicitly invoke his right to re-
main silent. 192 If Miranda's requirement that a suspect be clearly informed
of his rights during the interrogation still exists, this assumes that Thompkins
was fully aware that an express statement was required to invoke his rights.
It ignores the possibility that perhaps he thought he was invoking his right to
191. Velasquez v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 2d 331, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), affd on recon-
sideration, 205 F.3d 1327 (2d Cir. 2000).
192. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259-60 (2010).
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"remain" silent by remaining silent. The Court then states that Thompkins
three one-word responses at the end of a three-hour interrogation demon-
strated a voluntary waiver of rights. 193 This assumes that Thompkins had a
sudden change of heart and decided to cooperate. It ignores the possibility
that perhaps, realizing that sitting in silence was not going to stop the inter-
rogation and his rights were not being honored, his will broke and he suc-
cumbed to the pressures exerted by the police. The same principles Miranda
applied in reaching its conclusion were blatantly ignored by Berghuis.
Since its decision, Miranda placed a heavy burden on police to prove
there was a waiver, citing the need to protect the individual from incriminat-
ing himself. Berghuis alludes to a greater need to protect police from having
to make judgments in the field and risk having a confession suppressed as the
reasoning for developing a clear cut objective test as the standard of proof.194
This clearly shifts the focus of the protection to the police and ignores the
notion that "clear" and "unambiguous" remains a subjective inquiry. The
objective test makes voluntariness easier to prove for police, and it ignores
whether the confession was actually voluntary. It looks only to whether the
defendant specifically stated his desire to remain silent. In the most basic
form, the distinction between Miranda and Berghuis is clear. Miranda pro-
tects the defendant, and Berghuis protects the police. Miranda announces
defendants' rights as the ultimate importance in a confession case and takes
the defendant's side when faced with ambiguity. Berghuis stands for the
complete opposite and renounces defendants' rights. The decision sides with
the police when faced with ambiguity.
Berghuis concludes that "full comprehension of the right to remain si-
lent... [is] sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interroga-
tion process."' 95 True or not, this assumes that a suspect who is told that he
has the fight to remain silent understands this to mean that he must first ex-
pressly and unambiguously state he would to like to remain silent, before
continuing to remain silent. Without an additional instruction by the interro-
gating officer, the Miranda warning, as it stands, no longer protects the indi-
vidual's Fifth Amendment rights, nor clearly informs him of such rights.
The fact is, telling a suspect that anything he says can be held against him
can reasonably lead to a suspect incorrectly thinking that verbally stating he
would like to remain silent may be used against him as incriminating evi-
dence and using his refusal to talk as evidence of guilt.
193. Id. at 2271.
194. Id. at 2260.
195. Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1985)).
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IS MIRANDA ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION?
"Voluntariness" cannot be substituted for "clearly informed" while re-
maining loyal to Miranda. Miranda requires that they both be met in a se-
quence. A suspect must be clearly informed of his rights-given a proper
Miranda warning-and then must voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
choose whether to waive those rights. It is impossible for a suspect to make
such a decision when he has only been partially informed of his rights. A
suspect, who is told he has the right to remain silent, but not told how to in-
voke that right, is left a sitting duck for police to question for countless
hours. Ironically, the first step to keep Miranda intact is to change the warn-
ing that has become part of our society. Informing a suspect of the right to
remain silent no longer satisfies the clearly informed standard. At the very
least, Miranda must now inform the suspect of how to invoke his rights.
Specifically, the warning must tell the suspect he has to expressly state that
he wants to invoke his right to remain silent. Unless the Supreme Court is
willing to adopt similar changes, Miranda hangs in the balance.'
96
If the Supreme Court had only specifically stated it was overturning
many, if not all, of the Miranda principals it could have avoided many of the
critics' arguments. It is well established that the Supreme Court has the
power to overrule its own decisions, and it does so all the time. Of course,
many critics would have focused their arguments stating this could not hap-
pen because Miranda is embedded in our Constitution. But again, there is
nothing that restricts the Court from overturning its own ruling so long as it
abides by the Constitution. The Constitution does not require for warnings
or that a suspect is clearly informed of his rights; it only requires that no sus-
pect be compelled to be a witness against himself. It could be argued that a
mere reading of the Fifth Amendment is sufficient to inform the suspect of
his rights. The binding precedent for what is or is not constitutional begins
first and foremost with the Constitution itself, not the Miranda opinion.
Consequently, the power to make this judgment rests squarely on the Su-
preme Court. However, the Court owes it to everyone who is not sitting on
the bench to clarify the path it seeks to take.
196. See id. at 2271-72 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
At best, the Court today creates an unworkable and conflicting set of presumptions that will
undermine Miranda's goal of providing "concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforce-
ment agencies and courts to follow.". . . At worst, it overrules [silently] an essential aspect of
the protections Miranda has long provided for the constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination.
Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2271-72 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court appears to have left Miranda on life-support and is
changing the face of criminal procedure at an alarming rate. The next case to
come to the Supreme Court on this issue could very well be the last of Mi-
randa. Whether Miranda remains the best balance protecting constitutional
rights and providing concrete guidelines for enforcement is a matter of opi-
nion. But a rule drawing as much criticism as it has support must be ques-
tioned. There is rarely, if ever, a case that satisfies everyone, but what can be
respected is consistency and uniformity. By reversing the lower court's rul-
ing in Berghuis without expressing where Miranda stands, the Court has
only created more confusion. Berghuis stands for the complete opposite of
Miranda and trying to make them exist together is as illogical as requiring a
suspect to speak to remain silent.
If Miranda is to remain alive, the Court has two options. The Court
may erase the Berghuis decision or modify the Miranda warning to eliminate
any argument that a suspect was not clearly informed of his right. If the
Court wants to require an express invocation of rights, it should require an
express instruction on the rights. Both options seem unlikely in light of the
Supreme Court's consistent trend toward deferential police treatment. There
is not enough room atop the criminal procedure pedestal for both of these
landmark cases. Right now it appears the Supreme Court has grown old with
Miranda and is looking for a change. But until the Court specifically over-
rules or addresses the inconsistencies discussed in this article, confusion will
continue to grow in the legal community. Every defendant will cite Miranda
in his brief and the prosecution will cite Berghuis. It remains to be seen
which case the presiding Court will accept. After creating such a stir by re-
quiring a suspect to clearly and unambiguously express his intent to invoke
his rights, the Court could at least follow suit, and clearly and unambiguous-
ly explain to us all what to make of Miranda now.
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